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increasingly restrictive legislative barriers to the entry of peoples deemed undesirable, particularly "Asiatics," notably Chinese who, alongside British migrants, were on the move in significant numbers in this period. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada shared with each other and with the United States a commitment to building "white men's countries" around what has since come to be termed the Pacific rim. 5 In this article I aim to recenter the Pacific by examining the discursive processes and material practices that transformed the ocean as a medium of settler-colonial mobility, connection, and competition. In moving beyond mobility as one-way mass migration from metropole to colony, I explore the ways in which settler colonies promoted ongoing transoceanic connectivities, the perpetual "lifeblood" of empire, as Tony Ballantyne has recently stressed. 6 I draw principally on public debates over the inauguration and early lies at the heart of new histories of transport enriched by perspectives from mobilities studies.
Such work examines the role of transport "in constituting individuals, communities and societies in ways that go beyond the functional movement of goods and people." 12 In pushing beyond older emphases on material production, many studies center moving subjects and contested cultures of use. In focusing on the production end to explore the ways in which debates over a sea route produced space in the (imagined) act of bridging it, this article attempts also to bridge material, subjective, and cultural frames of study. 13 British settlers expressed and understood empire belonging in the late nineteenth century in diverse and multiple ways: through ideas and emotions, networks and exchange, and from specific locations, as historian Tamson Pietsch elaborates. These were "imagined, material and local British worlds" that reflected people's "lived experience of the globalizing the time appeared ripe to mobilize this "powerful global British national identity" to formalize and strengthen "an enduring Greater Britain." 16 Appeals to the unity of the Anglo-British Empire gained widespread interest among the intellectual and political elite, generating extended debate about how best to achieve and sustain it. Proposals ranged from consolidating existing ties to more radical constitutional Australia would take a "practical step in the federation of the empire" by supporting the transpacific route, and a correspondent to the Times believed that the route "would afford a much greater prospect of a real federation than could be expected to result from appeals or arguments based on the claims of kinship alone." 19 Imperial Federation was predictably never realized for lack of parliamentary traction in Britain, and self-governing colonies' fears for their autonomy. Imperial Federation also represented the utopian end of broader aspirations for imperial "consolidation" and unity, that is, a binding together of interests without significant political and constitutional implications, through which colonial support for the "All Red" route was mobilized. This mirrored the fact that although Greater Britain was not achieved as a political federation, it endured as "an important economic and cultural reality." "is of such an Imperial nature as to make it historic." 28 Promoters of an "All Red" Pacific telegraph cable between Canada and Australia couched its merits along similar lines, but that project also stalled in its quest to secure Britain's backing.
Besides reflecting strategic priorities, this refusal revealed concerns that new centers of regional influence might spring up wholly independent of Britain, marginalizing London as a global and imperial hub of power and information. 29 But a sea route did not require the same initial outlay or fixed track infrastructure as a cable or rail network and thus was not as hamstrung without Britain. It could also be terminated easily by pulling off the ships and this, Melbourne's Argus insisted, "renders it easy" for a government to take the plunge and "really test the value of the project" while risking little. The "All Red" route never lost its capacity to stir imperial debate. At the 1907
Colonial Conference speed emerged as a matter for high politics when the Canadian prime minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier, reviving Huddart's mission, moved a resolution for a fast "All
Red" service across the Atlantic and Pacific, connecting Britain, Canada, and Australia. 53 Achieving increases in speed of even a few knots on this route was estimated to involve considerable additional running costs and significantly higher government subsidies. As against the current subsidy of about £60,000 on imperial shipping in the Pacific (divided between Canada, Australia, and Fiji in the amounts of £37,090, £26,258, and £2,282, respectively), a realistic annual subsidy for the faster service across both oceans was estimated at £800,000, nearly half of which would have to come from Britain. Moreover, the construction of the proposed four fast ships for the Atlantic and five for the Pacific would be well in excess of £6,000,000. 54 The conference unanimously affirmed the (nonbinding) resolution whose only practical effect may have been to distract from the more modest improvements that companies such as the USSCo sought, leaving its director James Mills to lament the resolution as "wild talk." 55 Metropolitan commentators also expressed dismay at the proposals, and in doing so reasserted imperial priorities defined from London. Stillborn proposals for a faster "All Red"
route were perhaps the first victims of Britain's naval strategists seeking to confront the growing German naval threat by increasing burden sharing within the empire. Despite his reputation as an imperialist, the naval strategist Sir John Colomb deprecated a fast "All Red"
route, once heralded as the practical expression of imperial kinship, as "the practical example of a spurious patriotism." Colonial politicians, he contended, should contribute to naval upkeep before making demands for new investments in commercial sea routes. Britain had no claim over the "world's commonage"; its true sea responsibilities, he asserted, were naval.
56
These views echoed liberal opinion, the Economist unsurprisingly rejecting the "glorification" of "All Red" routes as running "counter to geography" and representing "a fight against Nature" (which transshipping at both Canada's Pacific and Atlantic ports appeared to do). 57 Britain's Board of Trade considered the scheme, but dismissed it on the grounds that the transpacific leg would never pay. Canada, hopeful that combined Dominion pressure might encourage Britain to reconsider, lobbied Australia unsuccessfully.
Auckland was "a drawback and a danger to Australia," Senator James McColl protested, citing cases where prospective migrants were persuaded to leave ships there instead of continuing to Sydney. 63 New Zealand exporters received preference for refrigerated cargo space over Australian requests, preempting them on the Canadian market. Canada admitted New Zealand produce at lower rates than Australian goods on the basis of their 1904 preferential tariff agreement. To grant an Australian subsidy would now equate to supporting a trade competitor. There was "no unfriendly feeling in Australia," stressed Fisher, but it was a "matter of business, and there is very little sentiment in business when we are dealing with the affairs of our own countries."
64

Conclusion
The "All Red" route, in the words of the British Conservative MP Sir George Baden-Powell in 1891, was predicted to become a "great Imperial artery, distributing life-blood all along its course, and assisting, with national pulsations, to develop oneness of aim and close cooperation among all these great provinces of the British Empire." 65 Canada, learning from the progress of their white brethren. While these strongholds at the ocean's rim might themselves be cohering as sites of racial exclusion, this was an expansive ideology, championing the ocean being carved out as a space for white mobility.
The route promised a mutually reassuring connection between two outposts of settler colonialism, but it was more than merely a means of physically bridging the gulf between Canada and Australia. Its promised mobilities promoted the expression of settler-colonial identity that was more overtly "white-minded" than Britain with its professions of multiracial imperial citizenship. Nor should the success or otherwise of the line, or the many pressures and constraints with which it had to contend, be allowed to distract from the expansive ideological visions to which it gave expression, both within and beyond the empire. In the longer run it became a prelude to reimagining a Pacific subdued into a benign, affirming, and familiar space by intensified settler activity, in which tropical island colonies were 
